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GOVERNMENT POLICY AND
FAMILY PLANNING

O

GEORGE

M.

SIRILLA, S.J.*

1, 1965 Senator Gruening of Alaska introduced in the
United States Senate a bill "to implement President Johnson's
pledge to seek new ways to deal with the population explosion." This
bill, S. 1676, proposes changes in the policy of the government
There was the expected negative
toward population problems.
reaction to this kind of proposal from certain quarters within the
Catholic Church. It came as a surprise to many, however, when
some Catholic scholars took a position actually supporting certain
As evidence
types of governmental activity possible under this bill'
raised by
issues
the
of
complexity
the
and
of the misunderstanding
the specter of governmental activity in family-planning problems,
one need only refer to the controversy that arose in Illinois when the
Public Aid Commission of that state, in 1962, considered using
public funds for birth control purposes, including disseminating inforIf one considers
mation and devices regarding artificial birth control.
the different views of Catholic scholars presented last summer during
hearings on S. 1676, and the present deliberations of the Papal birth
control commission in the light of Vatican 1I, it would seem that
there is room for discussion of this question of governmental policy
and family planning.
This paper will examine the opposing testimony of two Catholic
scholars on S. 1676 and consider the issues they raise and their
arguments, as well as other issues and arguments of interest. The
question of our policy with regard to the population problems of
other nations, and the question of abortion, raise special difficulties
which will not be fully examined at this time. Hence, when the terms
N APRIL

*B.M.E. (1952), Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: LL.B. (1956), Georgetown
University.
I Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean of the Boston College Law School, and Dexter
L. Hanley, S.J., Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center, both have taken
the position that Catholics can support tax-supported family-planning clinics if
adequate provision is made for methods acceptable to the Catholic conscience.
Fr. Hanley's position will be examined in this paper. Fr. Drinan expressed his
views recently in a public address given at Loyola College in Baltimore on
April 1, 1966.
2 Rohr, Birth Control In Illinois. 1965 CHICAGO STUDIES 31 (Spring).
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"family planning" or "birth control" are
used herein it should be understood that
reference is being made only to our
domestic policy and that abortion is not
included.
S. 1676
The bill, as proposed by Senator
Gruening, is still under consideration in
the Senate, and it consists of four sections. Sections 1 and 2 relate to world
population problems. Section 3 relates
to domestic population problems, and
section 4 calls for a White House Conference on Population in January 1967.
Sections 1 and 2 will not be considered
in this paper, and section 4 for present
purposes may be taken as raising no difficulties apart from those presented by
section 3.
Section 3 imposes certain duties on the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and calls for the creation in the
Office of the Secretary of an Office for
Population Problems to which he may
Among other
delegate these duties.
things, these duties include:
(3) (a) (1) determining the need for additional programs which relate to population growth and health;
(3) (a) (3) making policy determinations
in the field of population growth;
(3)(a)(5) keeping the personnel of the
department and of the federal, state, and
local governments, advised with respect
to their duties in implementing such policies and programs;
(3) (a)(7) cooperating with, and seeking
the assistance of, interested public and
private institutions, groups, organizations
and individuals in carrying out the policies and programs of the United States
relating to problems of population growth.
These appear to be the domestic policy
provisions of the bill that would present
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difficulties for the Catholic conscience.
As is evident, they are couched in broad
terms, and no mention is made of any
particular method for preventing conception or birth in connection with carrying
out these policies.
Conflicting Catholic Testimony
Two Catholic scholars, William B. Ball,
lawyer and General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, and Dexter
L. Hanley, S.J., Professor of Law at
Georgetown Law Center, testified before
Senator Gruening's Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on
August 24, 1965 relative to S. 1676. In
their testimony, they developed at some
length arguments to support their conflicting conclusions. At the risk of oversimplifying their positions, I will address
myself primarily to what I consider the
major point of disagreement as drawn
from their testimony, and also to some
related questions.
Testimony of William B. Ball
While Mr. Ball indicated approval of
the idea of government-sponsored or supported research in connection with population problems, he criticized the bill on
the ground that it is "plainly and simply,
a bill for the establishing of a domestic
and international birth control program
and for the creating of permanent federal
government organs for the carrying out
of the same."13 He stated that the government should not intervene in the area
"Ball, Statement Prepared for Presentation Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expen-

ditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, August 24, 1965, [hereinafter
cited as Statement]. Copies have been available
through the office of Senator Gruening.
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of family planning, as by providing birth
control services, 4 and he argued on constitutional grounds that, in the administration of such family-planning programs,
there will be "serious dangers to civil
liberty," and in fact there will necessarily
be coercion and violations of human privacy. It would seem, from his testimony,
that he rules out, a priori, any possibility
of setting up a family-planning program
so as to provide individuals with the opportunity to make responsible choices
free from coercion.
In developing his argument, he points
out that it is the weaker members of society, i.e., the poor and uneducated, for
whom these programs would be established under S. 1676. His deduction that
coercion would necessarily result is predicated on an analogy he draws with the
school prayer cases. He sees those cases
as involving the following elements, implying that they would also be applicable
to family-planning programs:
(a) sponsorship by government of the
practice in question; (b) these practices
involving matters in the area of the personal; (c) a weak member of society
(the child) cast in a relationship with
government (through the school); (d) a
general attitude in the community favoring the practices; (e) an exemption procedure available to the child upon the
basis of conscientious objection. 5
And he further states:
The Supreme Court... found coercion
to be inherent in the child-state relationship, even though the state's role was almost wholly passive, even though the
project was broadly considered good for
children and needful for society, and even
though the child could be exempt by
41d. at 6.

5ld. at 2, 3.

claiming his
tion.6

privilege of non-participa-

Whether or not this is a correct statement of the ruling in the school prayer
cases will be discussed later. It is Mr.
Ball's position that the poor person vish-vis any family-planning program supported by the government would be in a
situation analogous to that of the child
sitting in a classroom in front of the
teacher, and he claims similar coercion
will necessarily be imposed on the poor
adult so as to deny freedom of choice in
the matter of family planning. Presumably, what Mr. Ball is suggesting is that
the poor person will be forced to decide
to limit his family size against his will,
and/or to use some birth control method
or device selected not by him but by some
government or public official. Thus, his
argument continues, that even though the
government's role may be argued to be
passive (as in the school prayer cases),
the de facto situation in the clinic, for
example, will be coercive.
He further urges that "where government is to act in matters closely involved
with personal liberty, the rational basis
for its action must be firmly-not loosely
-established." 7 Here he implies a "sigG1d. at 3.

Ibid. Mr. Ball also refers to the following
statement in Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring
7

opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 497 (1965):

"In a long series of cases this Court has held
that where fundamental personal liberties are
involved, they may not be abridged . . . simply

on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a
proper state purpose. 'Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling ..

12
nificant encroachment upon personal liberty" in any government supported familyplanning program. He also seems to imply that the birth control services available in such programs would necessarily
exclude methods acceptable to the Catholic conscience, and he sees invasions of
privacy resulting from questioning of the
recipient or patient by public officials.
Mr. Ball does not clearly specify whether the constitutional protection of freedom
from coercion and invasion of privacy,
which he speaks of, would derive from
the free exercise clause of the first amendment, or from a right of privacy, such as
was developed in the Griswold case which
struck down the Connecticut birth control law,' or whether such protection
would be derived from some other source.
Testimony of Dexter L. Hanley, S.J.
Father Hanley addressed the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association on August 9, 1965 in Miami
Beach regarding the problems of public
policy arising out of tax-supported family
planning. In that address, he stated that
"I do believe that there are legitimate
reasons not only to tolerate but to support
[such] tax-supported programs." Almost
immediately after he delivered this paper,
he was invited to testify before Senator
Gruening's subcommittee. In his testimony, Fr. Hanley submitted his Miami
address together with a statement especially prepared for the occasion and relating
"to some of the wider questions which
are involved in the legislative process underlying such proposals." Undoubtedly,
The law must be shown necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
- Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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his address at Miami met with such
prompt and interested response from
Senator Gruening's subcommittee because
of Fr. Hanley's statement that the position
he took was "with full respect and adherence to traditional Catholic teaching
on the questions of morality which are
involved in discussions of family planning."
His argument begins with a statement
of certain fundamental moral-legal principles such as the following: that law and
morals are not coextensive; that the purpose of law is the common or social good
and not private morality; and that laws
should not prohibit acts merely because
they are immoral. Thus, regarding the
question of the morality of birth-control
methods, he states that: "Whether the
moral positions can change or not, the
legal issue is quite a separate one, dealing
as it does with social values and problems." 10
As was the case with Mr. Ball's approach, Fr. Hanley's approach places
paramount importance on the right of
each person freely to choose and act in
matters of such intimacy.
With these principles as a foundation,
his argument proceeds as follows: government may intervene in the matter of
family planning if there is "common acceptance, the consensus if you will, that
the matter of family planning is a legitimate public concern. Today, it seems to
be."'" Thus, given that the government's
concern in this area is legitimate, the end
1)Address by Dexter L. Hanley, S.J. before the

Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, August 9, 1965, [hereinafter cited as
A ddress].
10

Ibid.

, Ibid.
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or goal of such regulation will also be
legitimate and the question then is a matter of choosing proper means. Among
such means would be government-supported research (also approved by Mr.
Ball), and the distribution of information,
services, and materials on methods of
Inasmuch as
practicing birth control.
there is disagreement at present on the
morality of some known methods and
devices, Fr. Hanley maintains that in any
program of this type the government must
not approve or prefer any particular method or device to the exclusion of others,
and the individual's freedom to choose
must be preserved. On this latter point,
it would be necessary that the program
also provide information regarding methods acceptable to the Catholic conscience.
If these conditions could be met, then Fr.
Hanley would conclude that the common
good is not harmed, and that a Catholic
therefore would neither have to oppose
nor simply tolerate such tax-supported
programs, but he may in good conscience
even go so far as to "support the aims
of the program, encourage wider research
and concern over related problems, and
permit the use of tax-supported funds
even where the individual choice is in
favor of means not approved of.'

12

Freedom from Coercion and
the Right of Privacy
While Fr. Hanley and Mr. Ball both
recognize the fundamental importance of
freedom from coercion and from invasion
of the privacy and intimacy of the marital
relationship, Mr. Ball concludes that in
any government program of the type considered "coercion necessarily results and
12

Ibid.

violations of human privacy become inevitable," 1 whereas Fr. Hanley presupposes that it is possible for family-planning programs to be established and
operated so as to preserve the individual's
freedom of choice in this area of privacy.
Let us first examine more closely Mr.
Ball's contention that "coercion necessarily results" and his suggested analogy with
the school prayer cases. From his statements, one would be led to conclude that
these cases turned on violations of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment, as a result of the alleged coercion of the children to pray. The question of possible or actual coercion, however, was not part of the rationale of
these cases. They were decided, rather,
14
on the basis of the establishment clause.
The Supreme Court held that the activity
in question, prayer, was inherently or essentially religious and the purpose of the
program was religious, thus amounting
to an establishment of religion by the
state, in violation of the establishment
clause of the first amendment (as applied
to the states through the fourteenth
amendment) .16
It must be concluded, therefore, that
the school prayer cases do not provide
authority for Mr. Ball's coercion theory.
In fact, it may be argued whether there
is even any implicit authoritative statement by the Court that coercion of the
children would necessarily result, or be
unavoidable. In this connection, it might
1:;
Ball, Statement, supra note 3, at 4.
" Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421

(1962).
"5Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra
note 14, at 205; Engel v. Vitale, supra note 14,
at 424.

12
be noted that in his dissent in the
Schempp case, Mr. Justice Stewart suggested the possibility of a school prayer
program wherein there would be no coercion.' Since the issue of coercion was
not essential to the Court's decisions in
these cases, it is not seen how it can be
concluded that the Court rejected this
suggestion of a coercion-free program."
In the light of the foregoing, it may be
asked how Mr. Ball finds authoritative
support for his five-part coercion theory
in these cases. If his reference to these
cases implicitly meant that he felt government-supported family-planning programs would be a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment
and thereby indirectly coerce the consciences of the minority,"' it would still be
16 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra
note 14, at 318-20 (dissenting opinion).
17 The following statement from the opinion in
the Engel case was incorporated into the Court's
opinion in the Schempp case and indicates the
lack of relevance of the question of coercion
to the Court's decisions in these cases.
"Although these two clauses may in certain
instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Id. at 221 citing
Engel v. Vitale, supra note 14, at 430.
18 In the Engel case, Mr. Justice Black, in the
majority opinion, further stated:
"This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious
worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform
to the prevailing officially approved religion is
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necessary to show how the activity in
question, in its purpose and primary effect, is one that advances or inhibits religion. 19 It may be seriously questioned
whether a family-planning program (especially one wherein all known and acceptable methods are available, including
the method of periodic continence or
rhythm) could be considered religious
either in its purpose or primary effect.
While it may raise questions of morality
and ethics for the individual conscience,
relative to the various methods of family
planning available, it may be questioned
how there would be any governmental
establishment of a religious belief or
tenet, any more than there would be, for
example, in the government's present policy about nuclear weapons, the draft, or
dissolution of marriage. These examples
all involve moral questions (or could, for
the individual conscience), and the "powcr, prestige, and financial support of government" behind some particular moral
position or positions, but the activity in
question here is not essentially religious,
and it is not seen then how the resultant
indirect coercive pressure on minorities
to conform would thus render the activity
plain." Engel v. Vitale, supra note 14, at
430-31.
19This was the test for religious activity affirmed in the Schempp case:
"The test may be stated as follows: what are
the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion." Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, supra note 14, at 222.
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in question an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment guarantees and
liberties.
Since Mr. Ball's coercion theory would
seem untenable if predicated on the
school prayer cases or the first amendment, let us now examine this theory as
it might be argued to proceed from a
constitutional right of privacy in the
marital relationship, such as was developed in the Griswold case.2 0 The law
held invalid in that case forbade entirely
the use of contraceptive devices, leaving
periodic continence as the only legal
means for preventing conception. Hence,
the people were prohibited by the criminal
law from having any free, legal choice in
this matter. It is this express denial in
the law of other options that was held to
be, or to give rise to, an unconstitutional
invasion of the right of privacy.
Mr. Ball, in his argument, might be
implicitly urging that while S. 1676 does
not prohibit the use of certain methods
for preventing conception, the poor would
be necessarily required to use certain
methods against their will, and this would
achieve the same unconstitutional effect
as though certain methods were expressly
outlawed in the bill, as in the Griswold
case. It would appear that Mr. Ball
would not be satisfied by an amendment
to S. 1676 which would expressly require
that government support will only go to
programs and clinics offering information
and services on all known and acceptable
methods, including rhythm, because he
would still feel that in the administration
of such programs government officials or
others will coerce the poor and invade
their right of privacy in the marital rela2( Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note

8.

tionship. If such coercion and invasion
of privacy would be absolutely necessary
in any such government program, then
his argument would seem to raise a serious constitutional question. S. 1676 may
be distinguished from the Connecticut
birth control law, however, in, that S.
1676 does not favor any particular method
or methods as did the Connecticut statute,
and could be amended as suggested.
What then of the question of coercion
and invasion of privacy in its administration? Initially, it might be asked whether
Mr. Ball's view is unduly prejudiced by
his own impressions of some birth control
clinics? If officials or others connected
with such clinics might abuse their authority in some cases so as to encroach
upon the patient's privacy, should such a
possibility be relied upon to oppose the
bill initially, or should reliance be placed
on the means and processes presently
available to protect against such abuse
once the bill has been passed? It might
be further asked whether a system of
policing the program for such abuses
could be incorporated in the bill, or developed later by private groups?
It might be noted that the poor, in recent years, are becoming more aware of
their legal and constitutional rights, and
more public services are being provided
to them which, among other things, help
them to ascertain what their legal rights
are and to assert and protect them. Thus,
it may be questioned whether a general
practice of coercion and invasion of the
right of privacy of the poor in birth control programs, as feared by Mr. Ball,
would occur and, if so, whether it could
continue without being effectively challenged.

12
It would appear then that the answer
to the question of whether the bill should
be opposed or favored or treated permissively should depend, at least partly,
on the present need for the poor in this
country to be given help by the government in their family planning. As will be
discussed later, the Catholic Church,
speaking through the Council Fathers at
Vatican II, has recognized that governments do have responsibilities in connection with their own population problems,
and that human beings should receive help
in their family planning, at least to the
extent of receiving information and education about approved methods of preventing conception. As to approved
methods, it might be noted that since Mr.
Ball's testimony was given, there has developed a controversy among scholars
within the Catholic Church on the present status of the morality of certain contraceptive practices previously held objectionable. 21 The fact of this present
controversy, and the continuing deliberations of the Papal birth control commission, could have some effect on the
Church's official position on certain methods, especially those involving the use of
the "pill."
Thus, it must be asked whether there
is presently a population problem among
22
If there is,
the poor in this country.
Notes on Moral Theology, 26
596-662 (1965); Thomas,
What Did the Council Say on Contraception?,
114 AMERICA 294-96 (1966); Ford, More on
the Council and Contraception, 114 AMERICA
553-57 (1966).
22 This would be a question for demographers
and other scholars working on these problems.
See Hearings on S. 1676 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations,

2L McCormick,
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then it seems that the taxpayer, including
the Catholic, should be able to accept the
proposition that the government can act
in this area and go beyond merely supporting research programs. The constitutional objections raised by Mr. Ball would
not seem to present any insurmountable
difficulties to government-supported family-planning programs carefully arranged,
as suggested, and policed, if necessary.
Public Morality
A common moral objection to birth
control programs sponsored by public
funds is that the government is endorsing
public immorality, and for that reason
such programs should be opposed. This
was an objection advanced in the Illinois
controversy referred to above, against
"the use of public agencies and of public
funds to encourage and support artificial
23 This argument runs
contraception . ..
as follows: citizens have an interest in
the common good and a duty to prevent
the state from embarking on a policy of
public immorality, since that would harm
the common good; artificial contraception
is immoral, ergo....
This objection was not specifically
raised by Mr. Ball, but it seems that it
was at least implicitly considered by Fr.
Hanley. As a prerequisite to his approval
of any government-supported familyplanning program, Fr. Hanley stipulates
that the "government should not imply a

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

89th Congress, 1st Sess. 440-69 (1965). Another reference would be the welfare rolls of
the large cities, listing the number of children
in each family on welfare.

See Moynihan,

A Family Policy for the Nation, 113 AMERICA
280-83 (1965).
22 Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATHOLIC LAW.

200-10, 264 (1963).
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preference for any particular method, '24
and that "programs must provide adequate and effective counseling in the areas
of periodic continence. ' '25 The program
would not then be identified with any
particular method, such as those commonly understood by the expression "artificial
contraception," and which might be challenged as immoral.
There may be an analogy with government-supported domestic relations courts
bearing on this problem of public immorality and birth control programs. In
providing public funds for these courts, a
state is not advocating dissolutions of
marriages either by divorce, separation, or
annulment. The government in question
is simply establishing means and processes
whereby a party's own decision to terminate obligations of the marital contract
may be effectuated in civil society. Since
the government is neutral in such cases,
it is not objectionable as hurting the common good. The Catholic Church, while
opposed to divorce on moral grounds,
recognizes and permits separations and
annulments as morally proper under certain circumstances.
Although this analogy was not referred
to in Fr. Hanley's testimony, it would
appear that it is this type of government
neutrality as to the available options (at
least some of which are acceptable to the
Catholic conscience) which enables him
to conclude that the common good would
not be harmed by the kind of familyplanning program he approves, and that
2. Hanley, Address, supra note 9, at 9.

25 Hanley, Statement Prepared for Presentation
to the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, August 24, 1965. Copies have been
available through Senator Gruening's office.

Catholics therefore do not have to oppose
such programs.
Unable to show how the common good
is harmed by political toleration of birth
control, it is not incumbent upon those
who hold strong convictions to oppose
tax-supported programs, even where these
involve procedures not morally accept26
able.
While norms of private morality may
have social dimensions so affecting the
common good as to justify opposition to
public programs, private moral judgments
regarding methods of family planning do
not provide a basis for opposition to
27

government programs.

Referring to this last statement of Fr.
Hanley, it should be noted that he indicates there may be some "norms of private morality" which do have "social
dimensions so affecting the common good
as to justify opposition to public programs." From other parts of his testimony, it is clear that he would consider
abortion, for example, to have such social
dimensions "as to justify opposition to
public programs" involving this practice.
A related question here is the constitutional right of each person not to be deprived of life without due process of law.
Another Approach
The concern of the Catholic Church
with population problems of the world
is evident from the deliberations of
Vatican Council II and from the ensuing
Pastoral Constitution on the Church
(Gaudium et Spes). The Council Fathers
explicitly recognize the responsibilities of
governments regarding these problems:
Within the limits of their own competence, government officials have rights and
26 Hanley, Address, supra note 9, at 6.
27 Id. at 9.

12
duties with regard to the population prob28
lems of their own nation ....
They further recognize that in carrying
out these responsibilities, governments
must not interfere with the freedom of
the parents to decide themselves how
large their family should be.
For in view of the inalienable human
right to marry and beget children, the
question of how many children should be
born belongs to the honest judgment of
parents. The question can in no way be
committed to the decision of govern29
ment.
The Council gives express approval and
encouragement to research and studies on
population problems, 30 and notes the importance of educating the people in the
matter of methods of family limitation.
Human beings should also be judiciously
informed of scientific advances in the
exploration of methods by which spouses
can be helped in arranging the number
of their children. The reliability of these
methods should be adequately proven and
their harmony with the moral order
should be clear.3 1
In the popular, recently published, book,
The Documents of Vatican II, (from
which the above excerpts are taken),
there are interesting editorial footnotes to
the last two passages referred to:
The tone of this passage is clearly different from that of the section in 'Mater
et Magistra' (188-92), dealing with population problems and birth control. The
text admits the reasonableness of formulating an official policy on population
growth in a nation. It can be noted that
in the United States a small number of
Catholic specialists have been at work for
some time on the questions raised in this
28

ABBOTT,

301 (1966).
291d. at
3,3 Ibid.
31

Ibid.
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passage. Some systematic investigations
have been conducted at Catholic universities, notably Georgetown and Notre
32

Dame.

This sentence lends official sanction to
such efforts as the family-planning clinics
sponsored in a growing number of dioceses in the United States. The approval
given here would obviously not extend
to programs designed to encourage limitation of births by recourse to abortion or
33
similar morally unacceptable methods.
In this same connection, reference
might also be made to the introduction to
Gaudium et Spes given in this book by
Donald R. Campion, S.J.
Gaudium et Spes does not rest content
with warning against immoral efforts to
combat the population problems, or with
urging more or less realistic programs for
increased food production or better land
distribution in order to meet the needs
of rapidly growing populations. Here we
see a new emphasis added to the teaching
of a document like John XXIII's Mater
et Magistra. The Council Fathers now
recommend that 'men should be discreetly informed. . ... 34
It would not seem unreasonable, therefore, to argue that the Council is calling
upon governments to take steps, where
indicated, to see that their people are informed about methods of family planning
and limitation, and it is suggested that
this could provide a starting point for the
question under consideration.
Assuming there is a population problem among the poor in this country,33 it
may be argued from the teachings of
Vatican II that the government can and
32-Ibid. See id. at 302, n.270.
3, Ibid.
See id. at 302, n.271.

(Emphasis ad-

ded.)
341d. at 196.
3 This statement is not meant to imply that
what is assumed could not be proved or has
not already been proved.
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indeed should support programs providing
education to the poor regarding methods
of family planning. This activity might
also be defended legally as a proper exercise of the government's responsibility
to promote the common good by providing for the education of its citizens in
matters of crucial importance to them. A
further argument could proceed from the
correlative right of the poor to receive
assistance from the government, at least
in the form of education as to matters so
essential to their well-being,3 6 and especially in an otherwise affluent society.
The value that would be promoted, among
others, would be imparting knowledge to
the poor, while the actual decision as to
family size and method would be left to
the parents. 7
It would follow then that if there is in
fact a population problem, Catholics not
This argument is suggested from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 8, at 503. In
holding the law in question invalid, Mr. Justice
White made reference to a right of the poor to
receive some kind of assistance in family
36

planning:

"And the clear effect of these statutes, as
enforced, is to deny disadvantaged citizens of
Connecticut, those without either adequate
knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical assistance and up-todate information in respect to proper methods
of birth control."
3' ABBOTT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 254. This
reference pertains to factors to be considered
by the family in making its decision:
"They will thoughtfully take into account
both their own welfare and that of their children, those already born and those which may
be foreseen. For this accounting they will
reckon with both the material and the spiritual
conditions of the times as well as of their state
in life. Finally, they will consult the interests
of the family group, of temporal society, and
of the Church herself."

only could but should give support or
approval to government-sponsored educational programs of this type, at least to
the extent of morally acceptable methods.
As discussed above, the inclusion of other
methods would not necessarily raise any
greater problems for the Catholic conscience than would domestic relations
courts. The remaining difficulty would be
how far the government could go in helping the poor to carry out their decisions.
Could the government, for instance, legitimately make special economic assistance
available to the poor for this purpose, as
in the nature of public welfare, and then
let the poor go to a doctor or private
clinic of their own choosing? This may
require that Catholics set up a system of
clinics of their own, but it does not seem
that anything immoral would necessarily
be involved, or that anyone's constitutional rights would necessarily be deprived."'
The government would not be approving any particular method or device but
would simply be educating the poor as to
various methods so that they in turn could
make a free, informed, and responsible
decision. Even though the government
itself would not be directly involved in
setting up or operating clinics under this
scheme, there would, of course, still be
involved indirect support of such clinics
by the government. Yet, whether public
funds go directly or indirectly to the establishment and operation of clinics (if
directly, it is presumed they will be of the
Id. at 302, n.271. It might also be noted that
Catholic birth control clinics were advocated
by Catholic writers as early as 1939. See
O'Connell, Birth Control Clinics Needed, 101
38
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type suggested by Fr. Hanley), it does not
appear that anything would necessarily be
involved essentially different constitutionally or morally from the use of public
funds to set up and maintain a system of
domestic relations courts.

might in some foreign countries violate
"social, religious, and traditional objections [of those peoples] to family limitation. '' 40 And Mr. Ball intimated the pos-

Some Remaining Questions
Abortion
The traditional argument against abortion is, of course, that the life of another
is involved and must be respected. While
both Fr. Hanley and Mr. Ball objected
in their testimony to this practice, neither
one developed in any great detail an argument supporting the proposition that the
life of another is involved. It would seem
that for Americans today, the case against
abortion could best be demonstrated by
scientific evidence of the separate existence of human, personal life in the period
of gestation.3 9 This would make it easier
to take the argument out of the reach of
pragmatism, so that even if it could be
shown that social good would or might
result from an approved abortion procedure (as practiced in Japan, for example), the procedure would still have
to be outlawed as unconstitutionally depriving another of his right to life.
International Policy
The question of our policy toward the
population problems of other nations (e.g.,
the underdeveloped nations of Africa,
Asia, and South America) is too complicated with political, moral, and social aspects for any serious consideration within
the limits of this paper. It was only
briefly referred to by Fr. Hanley and Mr.
Ball. Fr. Hanley raised the point that
massive government programs of this type

Who Should be The Recipients?
This question was not expressly discussed by Fr. Hanley or Mr. Ball, but it
was hotly debated in the Illinois controversy referred to above. 42 In the proposed
programs, should advice and services be
given to all women, including the unmarried? This suggestion was objected to in
the Illinois controversy on the ground that
it would promote promiscuity. If the programs are limited to married women living with their husbands, this objection
would be avoided. But it might be asked
whether such a limitation would be realistic, particularly as to the "living with
their husbands", qualification. It is a wellknown fact that in many of the povertystricken large families, the mother runs
the family and there is no father regularly
living in the house. 43 Should the mothers
in such families be excluded from the programs under consideration? If so, the
programs may then be self-defeating as to
certain segments of the poor population.
On the other hand, if such mothers are to
be included, would the objection of promoting promiscuity be valid and unanswerable?

9 McCormick, supra note 21, at 602.

sibility of a racist misinterpretation of
41
such programs.

The Argument from Cooperation
There is the final question of the morality of cooperating in the material sin of
another. This relates to the extent of the
Hanley, Address, supra note 9, at 14.
Ball, Statement, supra note 3, at 6.
42 Rohr, supra note 2, at 48-49.
43 Moynihan, supra note 22, at 282.
40
41
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role, if any, a Catholic may take in establishing, supporting, or assisting in any
way in the programs suggested. The traditional argument here would be: that a
Catholic is not permitted to cooperate in
the commission of the material sin of another; certain methods of family limitation are considered by the Church to be
immoral and hence material sins (not
necessarily subjective, culpable sins); thus
Catholics cannot give any support to programs wherein these objectionable methods would be practiced. 4 This issue was
not explicitly referred to either by Fr.
Hanley or Mr. Ball in their testimony, no
doubt because a Senate subcommittee
would not be a particularly appropriate
forum for advocating such an approach.
Any critical examination in depth of this
argument and its applicability or not to
all possible types of government sponsored
family-planning programs would be well
beyond the scope of the present undertaking. It does seem, however, that it
would raise a serious question as to certain types of programs, for example,
those compelling the use of some morally
unacceptable method. Yet, on the other
hand, it does not seem that it should pose
an insurmountable difficulty to government programs wherein the main objective is to educate and impart information,
as suggested above, and without favoring
or advocating any particular method. In
such programs the principal value could
be considered to be elevating the poor
people through education and knowledge
to a position wherein they can make free,
intelligent, and informed choices.
"4Lynch, Notes on Moral Theology, 25 THEOXXV 232-33, 252 (1964).

LOGICAL STUDIES

It might be interesting to consider
whether the argument from cooperation
might not in some cases be applicable to
non-action on the part of the citizen. For
example, if Catholic voters refuse to supproprogram
government
port a
viding family-planning information and
education to the poor, would they perhaps
by such non-action be contributing to or
cooperating in the continuation and perpetuation of the evil or material sins of
the status quo, wherein the poor remain
ignorant about these matters and without
adequate Christian help from others?
Might the Catholic not feel in conscience
that no matter what decision he makes,
he might in some way be cooperating in
some material sin or evil, either that of
continuing the present conditions, or that
of the objectionable or questionable use
of some contraceptive method? In that
situation, could the Catholic not make an
honest decision in good conscience to support a government-sponsored familyplanning program, either one wherein education and information alone would be
furnished, or one wherein services also
were provided but subject to the conditions discussed above?
If one considers the present status of
the morality of certain contraceptive
methods, such as the use of the "pill,"
and the conflicting opinions among wellknown Catholic scholars and theologians
referred to above, it would appear that
official Catholic opinion might not be
closed on the question of the morality of
the unselfish use by married couples of
certain methods previously objected to.
In that case the argument from cooperation would seem to be directly affected.

